This article seeks to contribute to the body of research on the use of perception verbs in interaction and, more specifically, to enhance the understanding of how participants in courtroom proceedings exploit you see to manage the discourse as it unfolds and to negotiate stance. Against the background of earlier work on vision words in interaction, the study looks at parenthetical and non-parenthetical you see to reveal both perceptual and cognitive uses, and to identify their local pragmatic effect. As the analysis indicates, in the data at hand, lexical you see is more readily recruited than non-lexical you see, and it is found chiefly in grammatical and declarative questions. At the same time, it is the clause-initial you see that visibly brings out the epistemic tensions between the speakers and serves to contest the addressee's position. The study corroborates the claim that you see is an argumentative marker, whose meaning (and force) depends on its formal properties (position, complementation) and the relationship between the speakers.
Introduction
Despite its wide recognition as a comment clause in contemporary English, parenthetical you see has attracted little attention as compared with I think, you know or I mean, whose pragmatics have been widely discussed across texts and contexts. This is all the more surprising given the commonness of you see and the role it plays in intersubjective positioning and the weighing up of, oftentimes, opposing stances. Several recent studies which discuss the interactional behaviour of you see talk about its perceptual, cognitive and evaluative meanings (Aijmer, 2004) , describe its common parenthetical usage (Brinton, 2008) and point to its argumentative role in discourse (Ranger, 2010) . None of them, however, focuses specifically on parenthetical you see in the legal context. The few studies that do recognize the importance of discourse markers like you see in courtroom examinations highlight their relevance to discourse control and the effect they have on the illocutionary force of the utterance (Hale, 1999; Innes, 2010) . Still, there are no corpus-based studies focusing on the patterned co-occurrences of see with other discourse items, aiming to reveal the role of such patterns in negotiating speaker stance in contexts marked by power asymmetry. That is why this empirical work -taking a discourse-functional perspective -seeks to contribute to the study of you see in confrontational settings. It specifically aims to identify stance-related patterns with lexical and pragmatic you see as pursued by individual trial participants. The analysis considers the interplay between the properties of this clause (such as position and complementation) and the relation between the interlocutors, i.e. their status in interaction. The study highlights the intersubjective nature of you see and, in line with Fitzmaurice (2004, p. 429) , it views it as "the speaker's rhetorical construction of the interlocutor's perspective or attitude."
Perception verbs in interaction: Focus on see
Almost all languages have words describing perception and references to vision are no exception. In fact, vision appears to be the most dominant and talked about sense, with hearing ranking second (San Roque, et al., 2015, p. 46) . More specifically, vision verbs have been found to be the most frequent forms among the perception terms used in everyday conversation, which shows, as San Roque, et al. (2015, p. 49) suggest, that vision-related references form a "common core" of human experience in perceptual language. Trying to explain the high frequency of vision words in interaction, the researchers (San Roque, et al., 2015, pp. 49-50) point to three possible factors, stressing that: 1) "language use reflects a pan-human preoccupation with visual experience" and that "vision often dominates our interpretation of sensory information"; 2) that there may simply be "more occasions to talk about visual objects than objects apprehended through the other senses" and, finally, that 3) "perceptual language reflects both sensory and social concerns" as it may be one of "the most readily and regularly shared perceptual experiences among interlocutors," with vision being treated "as the primary foundation for joint attention." One of the consequences of these conversationally embedded and socio-interactional factors is that perception verbs perform a range of pragmatic functions. These, as San Roque, et al. (2015, p. 50 ) maintain, include: "securing the attention of the addressee" (turn-initial listen), "establishing legitimacy of evidence in the face of an addressee's scepticism about a factual claim" (see?) and "redirecting a sequence of talk" (turn-initial look).
Elsewhere, seeking a motivated explanation for the link between vocabulary describing the (accessible) physical and social world and the (less accessible) world of reasoning and emotion, Sweetser (1990, p. 37 ) holds that there are major similarities between the general linguistic treatment of vision and intellect. She (Sweetser, 1990, p. 38 ) outlines a structure of perception metaphors in English, focusing on sight and hearing. In her view, the semantic extensions of sight include: "knowledge, mental vision," "control, monitoring," "physical manipulation, grasping" and "mental manipulation, control," all of which are linked to "the objective, intellectual side of our mental life" (Sweetser, 1990, p. 37) .
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Following Sweetser (1990) , Ibarretxe-Antuñano (2002) similarly holds that perception verbs are universally used to convey comprehension and knowledge, and she extends the list of metaphors in the perceptual domain, adding touch, smell and taste. The metaphors she enumerates for vision include: 'understanding is seeing', 'imagining is seeing', 'considering is seeing', 'finding out is seeing' and 'making sure is seeing', to name but some of them. Ibarretxe-Antuñano (2008, p. 28) considers sight as one of the ways of "experiencing and being in contact with the world" as well as "the perceptual modality for identifying and gathering more reliable information." She (Ibarretxe-Antuñano, 2008, p. 29) concludes, however, that since the semantic extensions of perception verbs, including sight verbs, result from our own conceptualization and experience of the world, the more specific 'understandingis-vision' association should be replaced by the more general 'understanding-is-perception' link.
Metaphorical uses aside, phrases with sight verbs such as I see or you see have also been found to operate as discourse markers which help speakers "to manage attention and intersubjective alignment in ongoing interaction" (San Roque, et al., 2018, p. 386) . In the words of San Roque, et al. (2018, p. 376) , such uses represent "an extension to a specialized interpersonal function" rather than a change in meaning typical of traditional polysemy. Like Sweetser (1990 ), San Roque, et al. (2018 ) link cognition to the faculty of vision, pointing out that sight words are commonly found in reference to cognitive states and processes such as knowing, understanding or deducing, and that they enable speakers to negotiate immediate perceptual experience through language (San Roque, et al., 2018, p. 372) . Discussing the role of sight verbs in interaction, San Roque, et al. (2018, p. 383 ) associate them also with meanings of "focused attention" (such as 'checking on' or 'looking after') and with "expressions of socializing."
2 Talking specifically about the role of sight verbs in regulating interaction as it unfolds, the researchers examine the sequential context of the interaction and its intersubjective dimension. This leads them to the conclusion that sight verbs play a significant role as directives and markers of attention. As for perception directives (usually imperatives), San Roque, et al. (2018, p. 384) note that they "typically attempt to direct an interlocutor's attention towards an object in the environment," or that they can give a warning or elicit an assessment. Thus, they say, such imperatives create both "triadic engagement," by redistributing epistemic access (with the recipient having a basis to know what the speaker knows) and a "stance triangle" (du Bois, 2007) in which the speaker's stances converge in intersubjective alignment (San Roque, et al., 2018, p. 385) . They go even further and suggest that there is a close link between "jointly attending to objects in the environment" and "mutual appraisal of the conversation itself" (San Roque, 2018, p. 385) .
The interactional behaviour of you see has also been examined in several other corpus-based studies, differentiating between its lexical use (with a direct object complement) and its discourse (or parenthetical) use (with no explicit complement). One such study uses an English-Swedish translation corpus to investigate the interface between perception, evidentiality and discourse particle use (Aijmer, 2004) . Similarly to San Roque, et al. (2018) , Aijmer too takes the notion of polysemy as the point of departure and approaches it from a cross-linguistic perspective. In her analysis of parallel corpus data, she examines the core meaning of see (i.e. 'seeing with one's eyes') and its extensions which, as she says, depend on the grammatical context including complementation patterns (Aijmer, 2004, p. 268) . To demonstrate the effect of complementation on the interpretation of see, Aijmer (2004, p. 253) considers its perceptual, cognitive and evaluative meanings. In her description of discourse particle use of you see, in turn, Aijmer (2004, p. 264 ) observes that it is placed outside the utterance in the pre-front field or end-field, or parenthetically inside the proposition. She identifies two main roles of non-lexical you see: the connective function (textual level) and that of marking solidarity and politeness (interpersonal level).
Likewise, parenthetical uses of see are discussed in one of the chapters in Brinton's (2008) book on the comment clause in English, in which she admits that parenthetical see is less commonly explored than comment clauses with other verbs. Basing his observations on diachronic corpus data, Brinton (2008, p. 159) observes that you see has undergone a process of grammaticalization and that it instantiates metaphorization from the physical to the cognitive domain (i.e. from vision to mental 'vision'). Among the see-type comment clauses, Brinton enumerates you see, as you see, so you see and see, and she illustrates their use with evidence from several dialects. In her account, pragmatic you see serves primarily to claim the hearer's attention, and in particular to 1) negotiate with hearers their acceptance of the speaker's arguments (p. 159); 2) explain or justify the preceding utterance (p. 134), that is to signal the fact that "speakers recognize the hearers will need justification or explanation for the claims made" (p. 159); 3) mark negative politeness, by presupposing, raising, or asserting common ground, or by claiming mutual understanding when the speaker feels that his/her claim may provoke surprise or blame and thus constitute a face threat (pp. 159-160); 4) draw the hearer into the discourse and encourage him/her to follow the emotional trend of the discourse (p. 160) and, finally, to 5) jog the hearer's memory as to the necessary details, with the speaker not only presupposing but also asserting the hearer's knowledge (p. 160, cf. Levinson 1987 [1978] ). When contrasting the pragmatic functions of you see with those of as you see, Brinton notes that the first of the two is a neutral marker which does not assert the truth value of the utterance (although, as she admits, it often co-occurs with the expression of speaker evaluation [2008, p. 159] ) whereas the latter is "an affirmative marker which asserts the truth value of the utterance it accompanies" (Brinton, 2008, p. 160) . She also likens as you see to as you can see, stressing that it is mostly literal and refers to something within the hearer's sight, just as its modal variant does (Brinton, 2008, p. 137) .
Finally, in Ranger's (2010) enunciative analysis of you see, which is the last study to be discussed here, the clause is described as an argumentative marker which links propositions in an inferential relationship. In other words, as Ranger (2010, p. 127) puts it, the target of you see is not "the clause to which it is appended but rather the inferential relationship between this clause and a preceding proposition or, more precisely, representation." Like Levinson (1987 [1978] ) and Brinton (2008) , Ranger too acknowledges that you see is a politeness marker. In his view, however, the marker is not inherently polite or impolite; rather, as he suggests, its role depends on the interplay between its syntactic position and the relationship between the interlocutors (Ranger, 2010, p. 127) as well as these interlocutors' positioning towards the propositions (Ranger, 2010, p. 114) . Ranger (2010, p. 124 ) also links you see to spoken contexts in which the speaker holds the floor and he validly observes that in confrontational encounters, explanatory you see in initial position highlights discontinuities between the speakers (Ranger, 2010, p. 127) .
In light of the above findings, there are good reasons to suggest that you see and its patterned cooccurrences are an essential part of the intersubjective positioning strategies deployed by participants in courtroom proceedings (for an overview of descriptions of you see in various interactional contexts, see Appendix 1). With this in mind, in what follows, I present the most salient patterns with you see as found in trial data, focusing in particular on the parenthetical (or discourse particle) use of this clause and demonstrating its relevance to the interactional co-construction of stance.
Findings and discussion

Data, method and research focus
The data used in the analysis come from an English adversarial trial. 3 The examinations pertain to historical evidence and the manner in which the claimant (acting as a litigant in person) misinterpreted it in his work related to WWII. During the trial, the participants put forward and defended mutually exclusive accounts of disputed actions and events, and they referred to evidentiary material including diaries, reports, photographs and blueprints. It is important to note that since this was a bench trial, i.e. one with no jury present, the speakers did not have to orient themselves to the non-participatory audience (which is the case in jury trials) and so their primary communicative goal was to win the judge's positive regard and to affect his final assessment. This translated into epistemic tensions between the opposing parties who negotiated their stances in front of the judge, relying on a variety of discursive strategies (see, e.g., Szczyrbak 2016; 2018a; 2018b) . In the study, I looked at the transcripts documenting the trial to identify the most salient patterns with you see with a view to explaining their role in the stancetaking practices pursued by individual speakers. In doing so, I used the concord function of corpus analysis software (WordSmith Tools). Included in the analysis was also the modal variant of the clause, you can see. Following the automatic ordering of the concordances, I manually singled out the most visible patterns with parenthetical and non-parenthetical occurrences of you (can) see, as shown in Table 1 .
For the purpose of the analysis, I took stance(taking) to mean a collaborative activity through which speakers evaluate objects, position subjects and align with other subjects 4 (du Bois, 2007, p. 163) . As suggested in this approach, through their stances, co-present speakers "assign value to objects of interest," "position social actors with respect to those objects," and "calibrate alignment" between themselves, thus invoking "systems of sociocultural value" (du Bois, 2007, p. 139) . In agreement with this, as I too believe, stance is realised through varied interactional practices and linguistic resources which incorporate patterned co-occurrences of various discourse items. Against this background, the investigation aimed primarily to: 1) identify patterned co-occurrences with you see and their distribution per participant; 2) explain the role of parenthetical vs non-parenthetical you see in negotiating speaker stance; 3) identify literal vs non-literal meanings of you see and explain their role in negotiating speaker stance. Seen more broadly, the analysis sought to demonstrate the role of patterns with you (can) see in the intersubjective positioning of interactants in an institutional setting. Identification of such strategies, it may be posited, reveals the power asymmetries between the speakers as well as helps to understand these speakers' identities as negotiated in the ongoing interaction (cf. Bucholtz and Hall, 2005) . Also, the analysis was intended to shed more light on the organization of courtroom discourse and to showin line with Sinclair's (1987) idiom (collocational) principle -that speakers tend to choose co-occurring items rather than single units. The results of the investigation are reported below.
Patterns with you see 3.2.1 Overview
Following the semi-automated analysis, it was found that patterns with you (can) see were relatively frequent in the data and that both literal and non-literal meanings were active. It was also possible to see that non-parenthetical you see was preferred over parenthetical you see. Overall, you see was found in various interactional configurations (Table 1) , some of which are discussed in detail in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 below.
Parenthetical you see
Of greatest interest in this study were parenthetical uses of you see and that is why they are addressed first. As it transpired, in this group, clause-initial you see was most salient, ranking as the second most frequent pattern of all the analysed (parenthetical and non-parenthetical) co-occurrences. On the other hand, both clause-medial and clause-final uses proved to be much less frequent. This corroborates Brinton's (2008: 135) results and points to the prevalence of clause-initial you see also in the courtroom context. 5 Clause-initial you see as found in the courtroom data was interesting for several reasons. Firstly, in line with Ranger's (2010) findings, it clearly was argumentative and it linked propositions in an inferential relationship, which, given the confrontational nature of courtroom examinations, brought out the discontinuities between the speakers (cf. Ranger, 2010, p. 127 ) rather than stressed commonalities (but cf., e.g., Aijmer, 2004, p . 264 on non-legal contexts). Added to this was the prefacing with but, which too marked contrast between competing stances. Secondly, in the data, you see also tended to cooccur with evaluative items, many of which signalled some kind of trouble and were linked to negative assessments. Thirdly, more often than not (44 out of 64 tokens), 6 you see was followed by I, which, in turn, seemed to indicate that superior or "proclaimed knowledge" would follow (cf. McCarthy, 1994 , p. 112 cited in Hale, 1999 . Less frequent, but also attested, were direct appeals to the addressee (mainly the claimant) such as you see, you and you see, Mr Irving, claiming the addressee's attention and contesting his arguments. All of this corroborates earlier findings on clause-initial you see and shows that in courtroom talk, it carries a strong pragmatic force. 7 5 Unlike, however, Stenström's (1995) data which revealed the highest frequency of sentence-final you see. 6 Based on a corpus query with you see as the node and I as the context word, with the search horizon set at 0L, 5R. 7 You see has been found to be pragmatically stronger than well (Hale, 1999, p. 70 ) and more argumentative than you know (Erman, 1987, pp. 117-118 The above-mentioned clause-initial uses of you see are exemplified by excerpts (1), (2) and (3). In the first of them, the counsel demonstrates his confidence, if not dominance, claiming that he does not need to prove anything to the opponent whose position he describes as a "slightly bizarre suggestion. (1) [Counsel] So why would it need a gas type door with a peep hole with double eight millimetre thick glass and a metal grill on it?
[Claimant] Well, I think you will have to show us the evidence for this.
[Counsel] I will do.
[Claimant] And the evidence that this door was intended for that particular room and the evidence it was possible to obtain doors without the peep holes and the evidence that the room was not intended to be used for other purposes too.
[Counsel] No, Mr Irving. You see, I do not have to prove anything. I am testing your, I have to say, slightly bizarre suggestion that you put Zyklon B into a room where the people are already dead. You tell me, "Oh, well, that is because they wanted to delouse the corpses". Then I asked you, "Why then does it need a gas type door with a peep hole and a metal protection on it?"
On the other hand, the you see + you cluster was identified both in the counsel's and the judge's turns. Although, by analogy to you see + I, the pattern reflected the speaker's critical stance, as in (2), it seemed less useful for presenting his preferred argument or "proclaimed knowledge" and this may explain why it was less willingly deployed than the I-oriented pattern. [Claimant] Of this Jewish problem, but it does not, of course.
[Counsel] I quite agree.
[Claimant] So that does not help you very much.
[Counsel] I am not looking for help, Mr Irving. You see, you have completely the wrong end of the stick.
[Claimant] I am trying to help you because I am enjoying this.
Another interesting co-selection which emerged was that with the contrastive marker but, boosting the argumentative orientation of you see. One such use is illustrated by (3), where, again, you see is followed by the speaker's negative assessment (your omissions) and becomes even more confrontational since it is used in a declarative question. In fact, the use of you see in declaratory questions turned out to be a recurrent pattern in the counsel's speech, as illustrated by (10), (14) Turning now to clause-medial occurrences of you see, the first thing to note is that they appeared less commonly than did the clause-initial ones. As the examples show, this form was backward-looking, marking transitions between the arguments (cf. Erman, 1987, p. 117 ) and, at the same time, ensuring textual connectivity (cf. Aijmer, 2004, p. 264) . This marker had an explanatory function, which is the reason why it was sometimes followed by so or because, as in (4). Clearly, clause-medial you see was not as confrontational as the clause-initial variant and its presence in the data can be described as marginal. (4) Even less frequent, clause-final you see was too backward-looking and so it had the preceding clause within its scope, as shown in (5) . Its goal was to justify the speaker's claim and to make it relevant to the ongoing discourse. It is also interesting to note that there was merely one instance in which turnfinal you see was a question tag seeking a confirmatory response from the addressee. Despite its infrequency, for illustrative purposes, it is shown in (6) . (5) [Judge] I think I am entitled therefore to look at the totality of all this.
[Claimant] Well I would have preferred that they would have marked those passages in the full text of the speeches.
[Counsel] They are.
[ Quite similarly, in all but one case, if you see what I mean occurred sentence-finally, either in declaratory or interrogative form, serving as an explanation for the preceding utterance and signalling the speaker's need to justify his claim (cf. Brinton, 2008, p. 159) . Here, in agreement with Aijmer (2004, p. 262) , the wh-complement can be seen as a 'metalinguistic reference' to the preceding proposition rather than an 'ordinary reference' to an object.
(7) [Claimant] I think what he is saying is that nothing was to be seen when they inspected on site.
[Counsel] That may be.
[Judge] What is a gas fitted door.
[Counsel] It is a door which has seals so that air cannot come in and gas cannot come out, if you see what I mean.
As regards observations on the recruitment of as you see in the data, they are consistent with Brinton's (2008) findings. The data showed that as you see was indeed "an affirmative marker" asserting the truth value of the utterance (Brinton, 2008, p. 160) and that its meanings were primarily literal (similarly to as you can see). What is more, the presence of spatial deictic markers indicated that the speaker was referring to something that was within the addressee's sight, as in the excerpt shown in (8).
(8) [Expert witness] Yes. That is a collection of documents. Actually I issued this in 1990 when this was actually called, as you see here, documents about the question of German unity so that, when the book came out, the question was solved.
In sum, the findings regarding parenthetical you see are in agreement with earlier studies showing a link between vision and cognition as well as the use of vision verbs as discourse markers which help speakers to manage attention and to perform actions "that seek to attain or maintain alignment between interlocutors" (San Roque, et al., 2018, p. 385) .
Non-parenthetical you see
Although the focus of the current study is on parenthetical you see, as described above, the discussion of the varied senses and functions of the verb see, and their relevance to stancetaking, would not be complete were non-parenthetical uses to be excluded. Therefore, in what follows, I describe several interactional configurations with lexical you see, which, as it transpired, were more common than their non-lexical counterparts. Worthy of note is also the fact while parenthetical you see was predominantly non-literal, non-parenthetical you see carried both literal and non-literal meanings.
Given the subject matter of the trial, i.e. the disputed misrepresentation of WWII-related historical evidence, a great share of the questioning involved a detailed analysis of visual material as well as written documents. This does not come as a surprise then that you see principally had the literal, perceptual meaning, drawing the addressee's attention to tangible referents, e.g. specific parts of documents, as in (9). Non-literal you see, on the other hand, was found in various syntactic configurations (e.g. you see what; you see there is; you see how) and pointed to 'mental vision,' as in (10). (9) It was also noted, in line with earlier studies (cf., e.g., Stenström, 1995) , that the thatcomplementation of you see was rare. Unlike Aijmer's (2004, p. 268) observation, however, you see that generally did not refer to 'seeing' as the source of knowledge. In fact, there was only one example, in which you see that could be paraphrased as you know that, with all the other occurrences being related to perception and attending to objects which were within the addressee's sight, as in (11). (11) [Claimant] We gained the impression two days ago that there was a separate channel for the counterweight to go down?
By contrast, you can see turned out to be the fourth most frequent pattern (58 tokens). Such a high frequency of can can be justified by the fact that in the case of stative verbs like see, it functions like a progressive form expressing duration (Aijmer, 2004, p. 258) . It may also be argued after Aijmer (2004, p. 259) , drawing on Panther and Thornburg (1999, p. 339) , that can conveys the implication of actuality or truth and, further, that "ability stands metonymically for the actual process (the cognitive principle 'actuality over potentiality') with verbs of perception and mental process verbs." This means that 'the ability to see' equals the actual perceiving, as in (12). (12) [Claimant] Very well. The last picture that I wish to show the court and the witness and ask a question on is this large picture. This is crematorium number 2. You can see the scale of it from the people standing down there, the tourists who arrived up that path, and this is Leichenkeller number 1, morgue number 1, on which we have now zeroed in, in other words.
[Expert witness] Yes.
As the data bore out, you see marked a strong presence in questions, directing the addressee's attention to discourse objects and subjects or to objects in the physical environment (photographs or documents). The prevalence of interrogatives with you see, on the one hand, confirms the intersubjective dimension of courtroom talk (and the 'negotiability' of stance) and on the other, it supports the claim that vision is the most common basis for joint attention (cf. San Roque, et al., 2015, p. 50) . As expected, most of the questions concerned the ongoing argumentation (as in [13] ) or objects in the here-and-now physical setting (as in [14] More precisely, it was noted that grammatical questions in the present tense (do you see …?; do you see that?; can you see…?) were found chiefly in the counsel's turns. In fact, a significant difference was revealed between the questioning strategies pursued by the counsel, an experienced jurist, and the litigant, who represented himself. While the counsel favoured the present tense forms do you see…? and you see…? (without asking a single question with you see in the past tense), the claimant more readily recruited the modal variant can you see…? alongside do you see…? and backward-looking did you see…?, all of which were less frequent than the counsel's questions.
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That said, it needs to be added that question design was closely linked to the speaker's epistemic stance and the intended pragmatic effect. From this angle, it is worth remembering that both polar interrogatives (do/can you see…?) and declarative questions (you see….?) seek confirmation rather than This shows that caution is needed in an analysis of corpus data and that sweeping generalizations should be avoided. Last but not least, turn-final do you see that? (24 tokens) was generally followed by confirmatory responses (22 tokens), most of which (14 tokens) were produced by the witnesses in response to the counsel's questions (as in [14] ).
14 As regards declarative questions, Bongelli, et al. (2018, p. 41) suggest that they be explicated as: "I tell you that I am almost certain that p, I strongly suppose that p, but I am not completely sure, therefore I ask you for confirmation." Thus, they argue (Bongelli, et al., 2018, p. 41) , declarative questions represent the uncertain epistemic position; however, the degree of uncertainty is low, with the speaker projecting the "believing" epistemic stance. This agrees with the claim that through declarative questions, the speaker "merely seeks to reconfirm or alternatively to convey inferences, assumptions, or other kinds of 'best guesses'" (Heritage, 2010 , pp. 48-49 cited in Bongelli, et al., 2018 . In the data at hand, rather unsurprisingly, all but two of the declarative questions with you see were produced by the counsel.
Finally, from a broader perspective, it may be argued that all of the questions with you see aimed to redistribute epistemic access and to attribute a particular perspective to the hearer (cf. Fitzmaurice, 2004, p. 431) , thus collaboratively co-constructing stance.
Conclusions
In this paper I have sought to enhance the understanding of how participants in courtroom examinations exploit the "discourse" extensions of the perception verb see to manage the interaction as it unfolds and to calibrate their intersubjective relationship -that is to negotiate stance. Against the background of prior work in this area, I have demonstrated the link between 'vision' and 'knowing and understanding' and pointed to the fact that as in ordinary conversation, also in institutional contexts, speakers frequently negotiate their perceptual experience with the use of one of the most common English verbs, i.e. see.
As noted previously, the link between vision and cognition was borne out by the courtroom data which revealed that you see was used as "the foundation for joint attention" and to direct the addressee's attention towards physical or discourse objects and subjects. While both perceptual and cognitive meanings were present, pragmatic you see, which was the main focus of the study, proved to be less frequent than lexical uses. Notwithstanding the above, clause-initial parentheticals with you see formed a salient pattern (the second most common choice in the data) associated with the speaker's attempt to challenge opposing stances and to establish legitimacy for his own position. In addition, the you see + I pattern (subsumed by clause-initial you see) preceded negative assessments and was also recruited to stress epistemic divergencies between the speakers. This stands in contrast with polite or facilitative uses identified elsewhere, but substantiates the claim that in confrontational contexts, you see in initial position "highlights discontinuities between the speakers" (Ranger, 2010, p. 127) . On the other hand, both clause-medial and clause-final occurrences of pragmatic you see appeared to be more textual than interpersonal, which may explain why they were rather infrequent. With regard to lexical uses of you see, do you see…? and you see + complement 15 emerged as the two most frequent choices. The interrogatives do you see…? made confirmation or disconfirmation relevant to the ongoing discourse and by using them, the questioner (mostly the counsel) showed strong epistemic commitment to the propositions concerned. Equally interesting, although less frequent, were declaratory questions (also preferred by the counsel) which, similarly, projected low certainty and thus implied nearly equal epistemic footing between the speakers.
That being said, I hope to have provided more insight into how you see is used in interaction, focusing specifically on its behaviour in a competitive courtroom environment and the role it plays in the rhetorical construction of intersubjective stance. Still, to paint a fuller picture, more analyses are needed, demonstrating how other markers with see (e.g. I see or imperative see) are used to manage discourse and the participants' attention, and to negotiate subjective meanings in institutional contexts.
Appendix 1. Description of you see in selected sources 16
Source
Description of you see Quirk, et al. (1985) Functions of you see: 1) claiming the addressee's attention (1985: 1115) ; 2) direct appeals to addressees: -seeking assurance that the addressee is following the argument, -assuring the addressee that s/he is not being underestimated (1985: 1481); 3) its stressed variant is used to mark triumph -"triumphant" you see (1985: 1483n As you see 1) is a marker of intersubjectivity; 2) claims the hearer's attention; 3) is "an affirmative marker which asserts the truth value of the utterance it accompanies" (2008: 160); 4) is primarily literal and refers to something within the addressee's sight (similarly to as you can see) (2008: 137) ; it differs from resultative so you see which is more often figurative and which means "as you may conclude [from the preceding discourse]" (2008: 138). Ranger (2010) You see 1) is a discourse marker but should not be regarded as an "unanalyable whole" (2010: 129); 2) is an argumentative discourse marker which links propositions in an inferential relationship (2010: 114); 3) the target of you see is not "the clause to which it is appended but rather the inferential relationship between this clause and a preceding proposition or, more precisely, representation" (2010: 127); 4) its role as a politeness marker depends on the interplay between its properties and contextual factors (e.g. how the speaker positions him-/herself towards the co-speakers and the propositions) (2010: 114);
